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RECENT DECISIONS
U. S. 596 (1944). If the relation between the earlier and later
confession is so close that there can be no other inference than
that the facts of one control the character of the other, the Court
will reverse. Otherwise the question is for the triers of fact and
their conclusion, in such an uncertain situation, that the confession is voluntary, cannot be a denial of due process. It must be
pointed out that in the instant case the confessions took place in
the same building during a short period of time while in the Lyons
case the second confession took place in a different city more than
twelve hours after the first. The majority in the present case
found all of the confessions to be part of one continuous process,
and therefore, involuntary as a matter of law. The dissent, relying heavily on the Lyons case, argued that the finding of the jury
that the subsequent confessions were not coerced should have been
upheld.
In Illinois it has been held that confessions following an original coerced confession are presumed to be involuntary. People
v. Sweetin, 325 Ill. 245, 156 N. E. 354 (1927). This presumption
can be overcome only by showing that from lapse of time, or
otherwise, the party confessing was no longer dominated by the
influence which had induced the original confession. Recent decisions in other jurisdictions have held the coercive effect of the
first confession broken by a two week passage of time, Cooper v.
, 106 A. 2d 129 (1954), and a warning to the
State, __ Md.
accused of his rights before his subsequent confession a day later.
State v. Haner, 240 N. C. 85, 81 S. E. 2d 193 (1954).
The decision of this case seems sound where the confessions
are so close that they can reasonably be found to be part of one
continuous process. In borderline situations, however, the juryis in a better position to hear testimony and decide the mental
state of the accused than an appellate court. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, as the final protector of individual rights, has
given notice here, as in the past, that it will not tolerate "third
degree" methods of police investigation.
Richard C. Wagner
CRIMINAL LAW -LOSS OFJURSDICTION BY DELAY
IN PRONOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE
Judgment was entered in burglary prosecution continuing the
matter under advisement so long as defendant remained in the
State Epileptic Village and complied with its rules and regulations.
After defendant's escape from the Village and recapture, judgment of guilty of burglary was entered and sentence was imposed.
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Held (3-2): Reversed. Jurisdiction had been lost by the delay
in the pronouncement of sentence.

Taylor v. State,

-

Ind.

-,

120 N. E. 2d 165 (1954).
The unique fact in the instant case is that in a trial without
jury the court made no findings and entered no verdict, a procedure outside the scope of any criminal code. See Ellis v. State,
100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930). In cases involving a delay in
the imposition of sentence the defendant either pleaded guilty or
was convicted. See Notes, 3 A. L. R. 1003 (1919); 97 A. L. R.
802 (1935). It is generally recognized by statutory provision and
case material that criminal courts have the power to suspend the
imposition of sentence for a reasonable length of time. State v.
Everett, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274 (1913) ; People ex rel. Forsyth
v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 288,36 N. E. 386 (1894). Some
jurisdictions recognize the inherent power of courts to delay the
imposition of sentence indefinitely, Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U. S.
206 (1933), but the majority deny the power. Warner v. State;
194 Ind. 426, 143 N. E. 288 (1924); Grundel v. People, 33 Colo.
191, 79 Pac. 1022 (1905). Such action is said to place the defendant at the mercy of the judge, and infringe on the power of the
executive to pardon. People ex rel. Boenert v. Barrett, 202 Ill.
287, 67 N. E. 23 (1903).
In many jurisdictions probation statutes provide for the suspension of imposition of sentence after a plea or verdict of guilty.
NEw Yol PENAL LAw § 2188; IND. ANNOT. STAT. § 9-2209 (Burns
1-942 Replacement). Under California's probation statute, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203 (Deering 1949), it has been held that the court
must suspend sentence in conformity with the statute. Ex parte
Slattery, 163 Cal. 176, 124 Pac. 856 (1912). Probation statutes
have been held to be constitutional, not to infringe on the executive's pardoning power, and to be regarded as a reforming discipline. Cooper v. United States, 91 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937). Persons previously convicted of a felony are ineligible for probation
under some statutes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (Deering 1949);
Mss. AN. LAws c. 276, § 87 (1933). In some probation statutes
certain crimes are expressly excluded, (murder, arson, burglary,
rape, treason, kidnapping, second conviction for robbery) IND.
ANNOT. STAT. § 9-2209 (Burns 1942 Replacement); (murder, administering poison, kidnapping, incest, sodomy, buggery, rape,
assault and battery with intent to ravish, arson, robbery and
burglary) PA. AwNOT. STAT. tit. 19, § 1051 (Purdon 1930). An
order placing a defendant convicted of burglary on probation
was: held in Pennsylvania to be a nullity. Commonwealth ex rel.
Paige.v. Smith, 130 Pa. Super. 536, 198 Atl. 812 (1938)...
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By acquiescence in the court's delay in the imposition of sentence the defendant may waive his right to a speedy trial. Miller
v. Aderhold, supra; McLaughlin v. State, 207 Ind. 484, 192 N. E.
753 (1934). The two judges writing minority opinions felt that
under Rule 1-13, RULEs IND. SUP. CT. (1954 Ed.), the defendant
had waived his right. This rule provides a time limit of ninety
days during which a judge may hold a case under advisement,
after which, upon its being called to his attention by any party,
he is disqualified from further participation in the case. The
minority felt that this rule should be applied to criminal as well
as civil cases, that since it is the only rule or statute limiting the
power of a judge's holding a case under advisement, the defendant
should have invoked its provisions, and that since the defendant
had not, "he cannot now complain that he was denied his rights."
The three judges of the majority felt that the delay in making
a finding deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, and that the rule of Warner v. State, supra, that a
defendant is entitled to have sentence passed with reasonable
promptness, should be followed.
It is submitted that a proper decision was reached, not only
for the reasons of the majority, but also because the trial court,
in acting for the defendant's benefit in attempting to mitigate the
harshness of the requirements of the probation statute, exceeded
its power under the criminal code, and should not be upheld .in
such arbitrary practice. It should -be left to the legislature to
make rules, and to the executive to exercise clemency.
David Abbott
CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT TO PUBLIC TRIAL
Defendant, convicted of compulsory prostitution under Sec-tion 2460.of the New York Penal Law, objected that he was denied
a public trial when-the judge excluded the general public and .the
press, but permitted the presence of the defendant's friends and
relatives. Held (3-2): Reversed. The requirements of a public
trial under Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and See.
tion 12 of the Civil Rights Law as, modified by Section 4 of the
Judiciary Law were lacking. People v. Jelke, 284 App. Div. 211,.
130 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (1st Diep't 1954).
The qualities incident to a public trial have been the subject
of much controversy resulting in.a definite split of opinion. -N6te,
49 CoL. L. REv. 110 (1949). It is agreed.that the courts have the
inherent:power under-.the demands. of sound'judicial administrz
tmonio -exclud the. .publihbecause_ ofL. the. limit,6d.&capacity -of-the

